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ABSTRACT: Decolonisation and the fall of empires has led to the formation of small states 
in different regions of the world. Most studies of small states have however focused on their 
characteristic frailties, which have limited their influence in the global system. Nepal’s 
smallness is similarly manifested, emphasizing its geographic location between two large and 
competing powers. But such arguments negate an underlying weakness that stems from Nepal’s 
own resource incapability to oppose or directly compete with the bigger states in its immediate 
vicinity. This exploratory paper posits that, as a small state, Nepal would do well to reassess 
its own sources of national power and understand its limitations in order to recognize the roots 
of its small state syndrome. To fulfil such an objective, the paper maps out Nepal’s national 
power capabilities, and assesses whether they would be of any help to metamorphose Nepal’s 
small state syndrome into small power capabilities. This article suggests that, to unleash 
Nepal’s small power capabilities beyond propaganda and populist discourses, the Himalayan 
country needs to perceive its neighbourhood not only as the cause of its smallness, but also as 
an opportunity to strengthen its national power through trade, tourism, connectivity, investment 
and diplomacy. 
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 Small may be beautiful but smallness is typically not. The idea of smallness in the study 
of International Relations (IR) signifies the overall paradox of equality and hierarchy in the 
international system. Understandably, the notion of what can be a veritable criterion to measure 
the size of a state has been subjected to various perceptions and arguments (Maas, 2009). The 
characteristics of small states are either evaluated on the quantitative front, highlighting such 
variables as physical boundaries, population, size and the economic heft of a country (Kurečić, 
Kozina & Kokotović, 2017), or by analyzing a state’s inability to influence and affect the 
regional and international systems (Rothstein, 1968; Keohane, 1969).  
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 Situated between the hulking masses of India and China, Nepal has been perceived as 
small by default; and, as such, most of the literature produced on Nepal’s smallness is limited 
to an understanding that Nepal appears small because of its Gulliverian neighbourhood. Studies 
geared towards rationalizing Nepal’s smallness have looked at its position, encased between 
Asia’s competing powers. As a result, the externalities that define Nepal’s small state behaviour 
have constituted the baseline for explicating the country’s weaknesses. But less attention has 
been paid to how Nepal’s small state syndrome develops from its own inability to recognize 
and mobilize its national power resources. While some narratives have been generated around 
extrapolating Nepal’s smallness as a result of its own internal vulnerabilities, studies have not 
adequately linked its geopolitical sensitivities with the state’s own policy outlooks throughout 
history. As such, the structural weaknesses that lead to waning national power capabilities must 
also be discussed. Undeniably, an understanding has been developed of Nepal’s limited 
capacity to influence the regional power balance, which is contingent on its own internal 
limitations.  But, there needs to be a clear elucidation of Nepal’s geostrategic strengths as well, 
which can perhaps be attained by reorganizing and redefining its sources of national power in 
the changing geopolitical context. So, while geography has been seen to be a proverbial fetter 
that ties it to the actions and reactions of the neighbours that lock it in place, few studies have 
analyzed the opportunities that emanate from being located between the two economic 
powerhouses.  
 
 The main objective of this paper is to evaluate Nepal’s small state syndrome, and 
discuss possibilities for transcending it. In doing so, it would seek to re-evaluate Nepal’s stature 
in regional politics and in the intricate relations that define its place in the regional power 
networks, noting its limited capabilities in ascertaining the practical application of its own 
national interests through its foreign policy. The results will, additionally, assess the vulnerable 
position that Nepal finds itself in within its geopolitical space, exemplifying the policy options 




 This exploratory research incorporates the theoretical framework of small state analysis 
and underpins the asymmetric relations between Nepal and its neighbours, through a historical 
mapping of Nepal’s small state status and behaviour. This study aims to form a “broad-ranging, 
purposive, systematic, prearranged undertaking designed to maximise the discovery of 
generalisations leading to description and understanding” (Stebbins, 2001, p. 3) of Nepal’s 
small state syndrome. More precisely, researchers have subscribed to this line of problem 
identification and analysis, exploring the causes of Nepal’s small state syndrome in the 
Lilliputian sources of national power, not only in the Gulliverian neighbourhood. The research 
undertakes a qualitative-exploratory method in surveying Nepal’s smallness and its impact on 
the country’s foreign policy. 
 
 In the process of identifying the variables that contribute to the perception of Nepal as 
a small state, this paper focuses on secondary sources, including academic journals, books, 
articles, international and bilateral conventions, as well as the statements of state governments 
that have been issued through official channels. The study has also utilized certain sources of 
grey literature, in particular, the global and national news outlets, both for a recount of specific 
historic events and to grasp the general happenings of recent bilateral and regional affairs of 
Nepal, India and China.  
 
 




Historical contours: from Gulliverian aims to Lilliputian dilemma 
 
 To call any nation small would be a matter of careful contemplation, as it would 
generally refer to not just its internal capabilities (or lack thereof) but also to its position in the 
international and regional system. It is a sense of inequality that litters the various perceptions 
of states when recognizing that they are small in the face of an ever-changing world, and this 
understanding shapes the action and inaction of states that undertake an effort to fit within that 
very system. Historically, the Himalayan state of Nepal had assumed an expansionist, entirely 
militaristic, post-unification policy in the eighteenth century. While perceiving Nepal as a small 
state, as it has been made explicit in the steadily piling literature, it is pertinent to grasp the 
historical developments that paved its path towards asymmetric dependence with neighbours, 
and lowered its bargaining ability in relation to Asia’s two growing titans. 
 
 The classic understanding of Gulliver’s travels is mostly linked with the fantasy written 
by Jonathan Swift, where he puts a solitary Lemuel Gulliver first amidst the Lilliputians who 
seemed ever so small against his hulking, almost awkward size and strength, and then second 
amongst the Brobdingnag who easily dwarfed him, and in a way his identity. Gulliver goes 
from being a giant in the midst of “little men” to being the “little man” himself. While Gulliver 
himself tried to manoeuvre around the Lilliputians’ culture and lifestyles, he himself turned 
into little more than a possession in Brobdingnag. Nepal, in a manner so similar to that of 
Gulliver’s reoriented reality, has found itself in between giants, transcending from its erstwhile 
desire to extend its territories and build its aspirations of strengthening its position in the sub-
continent, to becoming small in the presence of giants.  If the Gulliverian analogy were to be 
adopted and analyzed in the aspect of Nepal’s identity of a small state, the territorial and 
population size, as variables of determination, would probably be taken as relative 
considerations. Nepal has a population of 29,453,152, as at February 2021 (Worldometer, 
2021), and (as generally understood) covers a territory of 147,181 km2 (BBC, 2018). If the 
territory of the newly published map by the Nepali Government presenting the disputed 
territory of Kalapani is included, the land area would increase to 147,516 km2. (The Kathmandu 
Post, 2020).  Though Vital’s (1969, p. 8) initiative is often used in studies seeking to define 
Nepal as a small state within his two quantitative classification: “a) a population of 10-15 
million in the case of an economically advanced countries; and b) a population of 20-30 million 
in the case of underdeveloped countries”, he has clarified that he uses such distinctions for the 
purpose of his own study, and not with the intention to form a baseline for a concrete concept 
of the topic. He promptly accepts that the distinctions he made are “frankly subjective, if not 
arbitrary” (Vital, 1969, p. 9). Not all states that are considered to be small - on varying basis of 
quantitative assumptions of territorial size, population and economy, or qualitative supposition 
of dependence and relational factors (Rothstein, 1968; Keohane, 1969) - display a small state 
syndrome that is characteristic of a wariness displayed by certain others. 
 
 Nepal finds itself in the middle of Asia's two nuclear powers disputing over their own 
borders. With gigantic economies and a modernising military, they easily dwarf Nepal’s own 
resources. Morgenthau (1948, p. 14) had argued, in a manner that would define the modern 
tenets of classical realism, that power as opposed to the traditional undertaking of military force 
was different in its political manifestation, whereby it is “a psychological relation between 
those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised” . This power struggle has resulted 
in one of South Asia’s most complicated games of dominance as smaller nations like Nepal 
struggle in the periphery to cope with their own structural weaknesses.  
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 It can be gathered, hence, that similar to the difficulties one would face in discerning a 
fixed definition of small states, the idea of power is also abstract. Power is generally understood 
as “how one state uses its material resources to compel another state to do something it does 
not want to do” (Barnett & Duvall, 2005, p. 40). In classical realist tradition, the relational 
effect between the capabilities and resources available to smaller nations when pitted directly 
against a bigger state has been observed in Thucydides’ Peloponnesian war in the Melian 
Dialogue between Melos and Athens, where a cynical view of ethics and morals in power 
struggles was showcased. When questioned by the Melian, who had refused subjugation to the 
Athenians, appealing for neutrality, the Athenians replied by claiming that, “you know as well 
as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the 
strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” (2009, p. 132). Dahl (1957, p. 
203) was an early political theorist who supplied a definition of relativity and argued that power 
was the “base,” “means,” “extent” and “scope” of an actor’s power over another.  
 
Nepal’s identity as a small state has been formed in the context of bilateral and regional 
associations. It can be traced throughout its historical relations with the British to the South 
and the Qing Empire (of China) in the North. Up until the Gorkha Army’s clash with the East 
India Company, the newly formed nation was built upon expansionist principles and the notion 
of boundary lines was fluid since the survival of any given territory depended on its military 
strength (Stiller, 1976), not sovereign ideals. The idea of a state that developed post the clash 
was based on a Westphalian model which was cognizant with a demarcated and mostly 
uncontested border, a stable population, and a political administrative, with certain and 
specified powers (Jessop, 2016, p. 26). The colonial ages, in this way, were defined by the 
acquisition of small and vulnerable territories, which were not considered to be “sovereign”, 
that were to merge into the dynastic aspirations of the greater powers in those centuries, often 
under messianic or civilisational pretexts (Mushkat, 1972). During the period, as Strang (1996) 
claims, “non-Western sovereignty was actively delegitimated within the community of 
Western states and societies” (p. 25). The road towards the acknowledgement of Nepal’s 
sovereign identity was closely tied to its British acceptance, which may have led to some 
asymmetry in the relations between the states and is a vital part of Nepal’s modern history. The 
behaviour could be considered characteristic of the European powers, which started from their 
own home ground: Europe itself had been experiencing the might of the greater powers and 
the consequences that stemmed from such displays of power. The Concert of Europe is an 
example of this, as “the small states had virtually no participation in its proceedings” 
(Vandenbosch, 1964, p. 295) and were divided and restructured into the vision that the Great 
Powers of the century built up.  
 
In the Nepali context, the small princely states to the south of its borders were colonised 
by the East India Company, and when it gave birth to its successor in the form of the Republic 
of India in 1947, Nepal did not just occupy a precarious position in the regional geopolitics and 
geo-economics, but also found itself between two powers adamant on regaining and carving 
out their places in the regional power structures.  Prior to the British establishing a formal rule 
in the area, Nepal was focused on expanding its interests on both sides of its borders, and “the 
British and the Chinese were perceived as obstacles to Gorkha's expansionist programs” (Rose 
& Scholz, 1980, p. 17). When Kathmandu inevitably found its forces engaged with both of 
these powers in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, it led to a series of compromises and 
negotiations. The Anglo-Nepal war that forced Nepal to reassess its position in the regional 
power structure culminated with the Sugauli Sandhi (The Sugauli Treaty, 1815), which entered 
into force in 1816, that would continue to define Nepal with its Southern neighbour. Keohane 
(1949) calls it the “Lilliputian Dilemma”, where a state finds itself unable to influence or affect 
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a system that it is a part of in any manner that benefits it. And so, for survival, alliances are 
forged with the stronger states, and agreements are formulated, even if they do not yield 
absolutely equal benefits for the parties concerned. 
 
 The Sugauli Treaty ensured that Nepal relinquished its hold on some integral lands it 
had gained prior to the war, as the “territory of Nepal that had been unified and expanded to 
Teesta in the east, Kangara Fort in the West and nearly to the confluence of Ganga and Yamuna 
River in the south, was curbed on all the three sides'' (Thakur & Sahani, 2018, p. 8). The public 
sentiment that Nepal was a part of an agreement that was neither balanced nor equal was echoed 
through the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, the 1950 Treaty of Trade and Commerce, 
and the 1960 Treaty of Trade and Transit between the Governments of newly independent India 
and Nepal (as with all the revisions which followed). On the other hand, Nepal had already 
suffered in its predispositions to assert its influence in the region when it came into contact 
with China because of the former's dealings with Tibet. Having fought wars with Tibet, Nepal 
had come under fire from Peking. The Gorkhas and the Valley’s respective relations with Tibet 
predate the eras marked by the strongholds mandated by the colonial regimes. When the 
Gorkha King unified the territories in the eighteenth century, that relation carried on, leading 
to certain turbulent periods. Nepal fought two major wars with Tibet during Nepal’s ambitious 
phase of expansion in the 1700s, drawing the attention of the formidable Qing Empire. It led 
to a full-fledged armed struggle between Nepal and China after Nepal refused to bow down, 
resulting in defeat for the former. As Dhanalaxmi (1981, p. 21) has noted, 
 
… the Sino-Tibetan army obliged the Nepalese Darbar to make peace in September 1792. 
The treaty that followed compelled Kathmandu to undertake to send five-yearly tributary 
missions to Peking and to submit its disputes with Lhasa for the arbitration of the 
Arnbans; it would forbear from any hostility with Tibet in future. The Gurkhas returned 
the articles they had looted at Shigatse. 
 
 The entanglement, moreover, created inescapable situations for Nepal. It had to 
acknowledge that it could not challenge the bigger powers head on, and Kathmandu had to pay 
tribute “to Peking every five years until 1910” (Levi, 1952, p. 242), as evidence of the 
conclusive end of the war. The relations truly transformed only as communism gained a sturdy 
foothold in China. The defeats cost Nepal not just territorial acquisitions, but also portrayed it, 
despite its reputed valiance, as a relatively less capable state in situations of direct conflict with 
the more established powers of the world. It had been but a few decades since Prithvi Narayan 
Shah’s Divya Upadesh had served a carefully designed warning for the newly created Kingdom 
of Nepal, and Kathmandu suffered grave defeats at the hands of the powers that surrounded it. 
The document that contained the much-used analogy of a ‘yam’ – or gourd – for the first time: 
within the vision of Nepal’s foreign policy and national interests, it introduced a sense of 
vulnerability that showcased its exposure to the threats of interference from its neighbours. As 
mentioned in the document, 
 
Nepal is like a yam (gourd) between two stones. Keep strong friendship with the Emperor 
of China; one has to maintain friendship with the Emperor of the sea (English Emperor) 
in the south. But he is very clever. He is occupying Hindustan. He is also eyeing the 
plains (of Nepal). When Hindustani (Indian) people will wake up (not tolerate them) he 
may find difficulty to stay there … we have to find out our Sandhisarpan (weak points) 
and we also have to change them into strong forts. (Shah, 1774, trans. Baburam Acharya, 
2004, p. 9).  
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 At every turn of its yearning to extend its boundaries, Nepal lost its domains. The 
realisation of the powers that surrounded Nepal, and the growing might on either side of its 
territorial boundaries, echoed in its reactive foreign policies throughout the years that followed 
the conclusion of the wars on both sides of its borders. The short, but no less destructive, Sino-
Indo war, Beijing’s acquisition of Tibet and the increasing influence of the global superpowers 
and regional powers within the Indian sub-continent, particularly South Asia, has further 
complicated matters. Following the decline of the British Raj, under the leadership and 
guidance of King Mahendra, Nepal made an effort to maintain equidistance between India and 
China. Nepal set forth to articulate policies that could preserve its integrity and at the same 
time pursue a peaceful coexistence with countries that could either serve as its strongest allies 
or create difficulties for its sovereign existence, as India was seen to be doing in the later years 
of the monarch’s rule. Nepal was “tacking with the wind” (Rose, 1971). Its foreign policies 
took the shape of what was necessary in order to maintain friendly relations with both 
neighbours. In the following decades, aware of the developing interests of both China and India 
in their surrounding regions, and their relatively growing might, ruling Nepali elites have 
developed a policy conduct grounded in the belief that their country’s sovereignty and, 
consequently its identity, was under peril from its neighbours. 
 
Nepal’s Gulliverian neighbourhood: casualties of dependence 
 
 The capabilities and clout of small states are often perceived “in relation to a greater 
one” (Bjøl, 1971, p. 28).  In the present context, territorially, economically and militarily, both 
India and China easily loom over Nepal’s position on the power maps. Having emerged out of 
the colonial legacies of the past, the neighbouring states have largely executed policies that 
have been assertive and at times bellicose, in order to fulfil their national interests and augment 
their national powers. Their growing footprints in Nepal since the 1950s, during the advent of 
rapid decolonisation, reinforce to the rule. The exposure of Nepali youths to the World Wars 
during the period, and their experiences of the global environment, led to changes in lifestyle 
of many, with a rise in local demand for imported goods, owing to the substantial earnings that 
poured in from military service abroad. While the Gorkhali abroad were a critical link in 
assuring the “integration of Nepal into the global market,” the Rana regime utilised the cash 
flow to set up merchant shops that supplied a range of ready-made goods, curbing the demand 
significantly for homegrown industries (Thapa, 2016). 
 
 The withdrawal of the British presence that had, in a way, provided a sense of 
recognition and stability to Nepal’s new statehood had permeated the regional atmosphere with 
anxiety for a dying Rana regime struggling to maintain its place in Kathmandu’s seat of power. 
The Sugauli Treaty had recognized the legality of Nepal as a state, allowing it to have an 
international legal personality in international politics. The carry-on treaty that Nepal inked 
with the Republic of India in 1950, termed as a Treaty of Peace and Friendship held on to that, 
but also carried with it a colonial outlook. Nepal remained a weaker power in New Delhi’s eyes 
and all that resulted from the Rana’s bid to preserve power in the nation by acquiring India’s 
favour was to bring the vital “systems of Nepal under India’s influence” (Khadka, 1992, p. 
142). For India, Nepal would always remain a weaker power, and its repeated interference in 
Nepal’s internal matters has seldom portrayed a ‘hawkish’ behaviour. 
 
 The turning point in Nepal’s ties with Beijing and New Delhi came when China 
assumed absolute control over Tibet in 1950, and went on to devise the One China Policy, 
which then inadvertently resulted in India taking a wearier stance in the face of Beijing’s 
ambitions in its conduct of South Asian affairs. China was rigorous in its desire for Nepal to 
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step back from the 1856 Treaty of Thapathali that it had concluded with Tibet after the third 
Nepal Tibet war, where it recognized Tibet as a sovereign state. China set the table for the 1960 
Nepal-China Boundary Agreement, as Nepal accepted Beijing’s sovereign jurisdiction over 
Tibet (Chakraborty, 2020). It set the stage for the following decades, where the Tibetan 
Autonomous Region or TAR always formed a cornerstone in different forms. To properly track 
Nepal’s descent into becoming a small state in these regional and bilateral connotations, it 
would be fruitful to look at the limitations that these elements place in the exercise of Nepal’s 
foreign policy. Rana (2013) has noted that China’s security concerns regarding Tibet and the 
inflow of Tibetan refugees in Nepal, coupled with the asymmetries of the India-locked situation 
point towards the uncertainty in a small state’s policy options. If power is to be taken as “an 
umbrella concept that denotes anything that establishes and maintains the control of Actor A 
over Actor B” (Couloumbis & Wolfe, 1986), Nepal’s policy has mostly been reactive in 
accordance to those of India and China.  
 




Source: Map created by Kathmandu-based software developer Saurav Bhattarai, using “World Country 
Polygons” by World Bank, licensed under CC-BY 4.0, and reproduced here with permission. 
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 For India, Nepal became an imperative concern as soon as China finally made its moves 
into the Himalayan region. Independent India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru had 
infamously commented that, while India “wished” to deal with Nepal as” an independent 
country,”  
 
… the Himalayas have provided us with magnificent frontiers … We cannot allow that 
barrier to be penetrated because it is also the principal barrier to India. Therefore, much 
as we appreciate the independence of Nepal, we cannot allow anything to go wrong in 
Nepal or permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened, because that would be a risk to 
our own security. (cited in Rose, 1971, p. 192).  
 
 This perception has affected the Indian leaders’ outlook on Nepal’s sovereign affairs 
for generations. The categorisation of Nepal’s weak external influence and its small state 
syndrome comes from such blatant declarations of supposedly justified interference from larger 
neighbours. From Jawaharlal Nehru’s Himalayan Frontier to Narendra Modi’s Big Brother 
narrative, Kathmandu has stuttered in a perennial state of unease when conducting its affairs 
with New Delhi, where it has viewed itself in a position of vulnerability. Beijing’s interests 
have been equally imperative in Nepal’s small state behavioural patterns. “China’s behaviour 
is clearly reflective of a power that has used every opportunity to expand its influence and 
relative power over its smaller neighbour” (Dabhade & Pant, 2004, p. 162). The perception of 
threat that this is likely to generate in India is bound to create a ripple effect.  
 
 Nepal’s landlocked nature places it at an additional disadvantage in its pursuit towards 
actualising its foreign policy with limited leverage to garner its interests (Dabhade & Pant, 
2004, pp. 166-167). Small states have routinely tried to accrue their own gain between 
conflicting great powers, and this was seen in the behaviour of unaligned small states during 
the Cold War (Fox, 1969). Though Nepal had been a part of the non-aligned movement (NAM), 
it could never formulate its policies or enact them in a way that could place it in a beneficial 
position during the Indo-Sino conflict. It is simply a reflection of the conditions that have 
defined both its smallness and landlocked nature. As Ghoble (1992, p. 600) has noted, since 
the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954 regarding Tibet and India’s northern borders, New Delhi 
had been adamant in its stance that it had “no intention to share Nepal as a “sphere of influence” 
with China”; and Kathmandu had to rephrase its stance on Tibet. The Indian defeat in the first 
Sino-Indian war posed some challenges and opportunities for Nepal as it tried to diversify its 
relations with China, while situating itself as a neutral player. Yet, even as Beijing tried to 
sideline India and Nepal’s special relationship by contributing “substantial investments”, it 
was, for China, “like fighting on enemy territory” (Ghoble, 1992, p. 602). 
 
Additionally, India has retaliated on almost every occasion that Nepal has tried to lower 
its dependence or tried to build more robust ties with China. This was seen when Kathmandu 
decided to import arms worth around US$ 20m from the Nepal China Industrial Cooperation 
(NORINCO), with India aware of this development since 1987, warning Nepal that it could 
not purchase the arms without New Delhi’s permission (Garver, 1992, p. 76). The point of 
contention was the 1965 secret letter of exchange that accompanied the 1950 Treaty. The letter, 
in particular, limited Nepal’s ability to import weapons without the explicit consent of its 
southern neighbour (Article 3). When it was finally disclosed, it became the cause of one of 
the most crippling blockades Nepal faced, in 1988. Under the unfortunate circumstance of the 
expiration of the 1978 Treaty of Transit, India instituted an economic blockade that created 
situations of internal instability, obliging Kathmandu to seek a renewal of the trade treaty and 
to develop separate agreements for trade and transit (Crossette, 1989). This attitude of India 
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looking at Nepal’s ties with China with suspicion has carried over to modern times. A reflection 
of this tendency could be seen in the recent Kalapani border issue - the contested area can be 
seen in the image, where a sharp protrusion can be seen on the left. This unfortunately coincided 
with the Indo-Sino clash in Eastern Ladakh. Indian Army Chief Manoj M. Naravane suggested 
that, by raising concerns over India’s inauguration of a road in the Lipulekh Pass, Nepal was 
acting “at the behest of someone else” (The Economic Times, 2020). 
 
 While India sees Nepal in terms of its own security concerns, and for maintaining its 
dominant presence in South Asia, China adopts an outlook that would feed into creating an 
environment suitable for its ambitious economic aspirations (Sigdel, 2018). Nepal’s 
vulnerability, apparent both in its exchanges with the neighbouring powers and the limited 
capabilities of its internal political structures, filters into its identity as a small state. Taking 
note of the intensifying move of the “Asian Giants” into Nepal’s hydropower sector, Upadhya 
(2012, p. 166) iterated the “candour with which the People’s Liberation Army chief commented 
on Nepalese political affairs and his insistence on dealing directly with the Nepalese Army 
suggests that the military has gained a disproportionate influence over China’s Nepal policy”. 
It is uncertain whether China’s rhetoric of a peaceful rise is likely to endure as it grows in its 
assertiveness; while India’s hold can only tighten once Beijing diversifies its motivations in 
South Asia. 
 
Lilliputian sources of national power: Impact on Nepal’s foreign policy behaviour 
 
 National power is a country’s capability to utilize its resources in order to achieve its 
national interest. “It tells us as to how powerful or weak a particular nation is in securing its 
national goals” (Hartmann, 1978). This capacity is then contingent on several factors and 
differs from state to state, and so it becomes a matter of relative factors, especially when small 
states are brought into the equation. Morgenthau (1948, p. 112) argued that permanent features 
– such as geography and natural resources – form the baseline of such an analysis and lead on 
to the more fluid factors such as diplomatic clout, national character, military preparedness, 
population, and the national morale of the people to support its government’s strategies. His 
cautionary advice is not to fall for the “fallacy of the single factor … to the neglect of all 
others”.  
 
 Thus, if the efficiency of the foreign policy is the outcome of a state’s national power, 
many small states generally suffer from certain structural constraints that emerge from their 
own internal restraints, as much as they do from their geopolitical setting. The foreign policy 
analysis of small states, as it is, has rarely been undertaken systematically, for the simple reason 
that the impact they have on the international system is suggested to be entirely too narrow 
when compared to that of the big powers (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2004). The scope of Nepal’s 
foreign policy is examined in the same manner in the exercise of its national power. Nepal’s 
geography locks it on three sides with India and on the other side by the Tibet Autonomous 
Region (TAR) ardently guarded by China. Coupled with its lack of economic growth and 
development, these factors have largely been the primary determinants of its policy practice 
(Atique, 1983). Nepal’s sources of power are thus, relative to that of its immediate neighbours, 
as national power is itself a relative, dynamic and contextual concept (Jablonsky, 2006). 
Beyond the geographical space and its relatively small population, it also ranks 119 out of 139 
countries in the Global Firepower ranking, measuring military muscle, natural resources, 
logistics, geography and financial resources. It scores a 3.470 PwrIndx (0.000 being perfect), 
whereas India and China both stand amongst the top five countries that have superior military 
strength and rank 4th and 3rd, respectively (Global Firepower, 2021). It would be quite 
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unrealistic for Nepal to compete with China and India, or hope to hold any sense of influence 
with such hard sources of national power standards that include the use of coercive diplomacy, 
flexing of military might and harsh economic sanctions (Wilson, 2008, p. 114).  
 
 The concept of power has evolved beyond Morgenthau’s theorisation with 
developments in technology and growing mobility, giving way for “territorial states” to 
transform into “market states” that embrace “new opportunities for international trade, open 
borders, globalisation, information technology and human mobility” (Koh, 2019, p. ix). 
Nepal’s resources are fairly limited and in the occasion of any direct struggle, it would be 
unable to directly engage militarily with its neighbours. If it were to exercise soft power that 
focuses on intangible factors that arise from “the values an organisation or country expresses 
in its culture, in the examples it sets by its internal practices and policies, and in the way it 
handles its relations with others” (Nye, 2008, p. 95), it would need to dispense its resources in 
ways that could actually assist its capabilities. The recently unveiled foreign policy endorsed 
by the Oli administration reiterates Nepal’s disposition towards non-alignment as a viable 
option, and has additionally identified soft power as a tool to attain foreign policy goals.  
 
Nepal ranked 95th in Brand Finance’s Global Soft Power Index 2021, and its capability 
to attract and influence in accordance to such a score would be extremely low. It is, moreover, 
exacerbated by its resource scarcity and weak institutions. In view of such weaknesses in a 
state’s national power identification and enaction, there is a tendency for small states that are 
lacking in their own functional capabilities to behave in a way that is different to the 
assertiveness that the bigger powers display. Their foreign policies are mostly constructed 
around accommodation and evading the threats that stem from great power conflict. The 
behavioural patterns of Nepal’s foreign policy behaviour can be evaluated with East (1973, p. 
557) and his identification of smallness in accordance to a country’s territorial and population 
size, its Gross National Product (GNP) and limited military capabilities,  
 
(a) Low levels of overall participation in world affairs; (b) high levels of activity in 
intergovernmental organisations (IGOs); (c) high levels of support for international legal 
norms; (d) avoidance to the use of force as a technique of statecraft; (e) avoidance of 
behaviour and policies which tend to alienate the more powerful states in the system; (f) 
a narrow functional and geographic range of concern in foreign policy activities; and (g) 
frequent utilisation of moral and normative positions on international issues. 
 
 Nepal has been trying to increase its participation in international institutions and it has 
always structured its international policies keeping the principles of the equality of states at the 
centre of its activities. The 2015 Constitution outlines this belief in Section 51(m), stating that 
Nepal would “conduct an independent foreign policy based on the Charter of the United 
Nations, non-alignment, the principles of Panchsheel,” (defining the ideals of non-interference 
in another state’s affairs, non-aggression, respect for territorial integrity, conducting mutually 
beneficial relations encased in the belief of equality, and peaceful co-existence) “international 
law and the norms of world peace.” Prime Minister Oli’s address to the 75th United Nations 
General Assembly in 2020 had put emphasis on disarmament, and the importance and safety 
of UN Peacekeepers, and had restated Nepal’s foreign policy as listed in the Constitution and 
appealed for the prioritisation of “amity with all and enmity with none” (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Government of Nepal, 2020). Nepal has been proactive in this role, standing as the 
fourth largest Uniformed Personnel Contributor to the UN, as of March, 2021 (United Nations 
Peacekeeping, 2021). On the case of using a moral position and avoiding force in international 
relations, Nepal supports disarmament and sends its forces in droves each year to peacekeeping 
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missions because it does not, and cannot, support force as an instrument of state policy or 
intervention. It would be unable to defend itself against acts of aggression.  
 
 Small states that remain vulnerable to their external climate and internal weakness are, 
in principle, technically free to choose from a wide range of policies that stretch from forming 
alliances, staying neutral, balancing or bandwagoning (Thorhallsson & Steinsson, 2017). They 
normally accept a “hierarchical relationship” in order to “(i) enhance security and territorial 
integrity; (ii) clearly define and protect property rights at home and abroad (which reduces 
uncertainty, disputes, and the transaction costs of trade and diplomacy); and (iii) set and enforce 
standards of behaviour” (Thorhallsson & Steinsson, 2017). Alliances are mostly formed by 
small states’ willingness to either ensure interests and survival by getting together with other 
weaker powers against a domineering force, or by bandwagoning with the greater power itself. 
Balancing and bandwagoning go hand in hand: small states balance “with others against 
prevailing threat,” and bandwagon by siding with the “source of danger” (Walt, 1987, p. 17). 
For a small state between two conflicting powers, options are limited, even at the best of times. 
 
 Nepal has tried to extend its foreign policy practice beyond its neighbourhood; 
however, historically, it has been a product of such regional hierarchies. “States that are close 
to a country with large offensive capabilities (and that are far from potential allies) may be 
forced to bandwagon because balancing alliances are simply not viable” (Walt, 1987, p. 25). 
“Nepal's balancing act between India and China has always been precarious akin to a game of 
national self-assertion versus regional accommodation” (Dahal, 2011, p. 43). It has been 
understood that “the international environment of interest to the great Power is global, whereas 
for the small it is mainly regional” (Bjøl, 1968, p. 159), and in the past, it has jumped back and 
forth in adopting the individual policies, according to the chances that suited its survival. 
Through these changing periods in global history, Nepal did try to cement its position in the 
world order, serving as a non-permanent member of the UNSC twice (969-1970 and 1988-
1989), along with trying to further the non-aligned movement (NAM) by becoming one of its 
founding members. 
 
 The state has tried to engage in several multilateral institutions akin to NAM, and it 
remains in groupings that can provide it with some bargaining power against the wider global 
and regional powers. Yet, in its aspirations of economic development, Nepal remains chained 
to political wills that are more or less driven by the desire to maintain power by trying to avoid 
risks coming from neighbouring power structures. Even as it has been trying to graduate from 
the least developed country (LDC) status, its economic constraints are palpable since this 
political mindset has dominated Nepali policy practice. “Token agreements” that “were signed 
just to irritate India, rather than utilising” Xi Jinping’s 2019 “visit to discuss important projects 
for investment” can be taken as an example of the haste and paranoia that the Nepali 
government operates by (Shakya, 2020, para. 8), while the investment benchmark remains 
unimpressive, leading to a heavy reliance on foreign aid. As Shakya (2019, para. 5) narrates, 
 
Nepal needs over US$100 billion in investment over the next decade in order to 
graduate to a middle-income country. With low domestic capital formation, only 
foreign investment can bring about the much-needed impetus to economic growth. But 
while there have been many attempts to attract investment, on the ground realities pose 
a huge challenge. The country’s mindset cannot deal with foreign investment and still 
prioritise protecting domestic businesses. Nepal is yet to realise that it must compete 
for foreign investors with hundreds of countries: there is no queue of people wanting to 
come to Nepal. 
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 Another important facet to recognize in Nepal’s foreign policy practice is that its 
immediate opportunities and challenges arise from the edges of its own borders. India and 
China both see Asia as the next engine of development. And yet, even as its neighbours have 
developed and sustained a steady level of economic growth in the past decades, Nepal has been 
trying to escape its landlocked developing status. It is a part of the Belt and Road Initiative and 
has been a recipient of aid and assistance from both its neighbours, though its development has 
been more often than not contingent on the political constancy in its bilateral associations and 
stability within Sino-Indo power relations. Muni (2016, p. 32) states that,  
 
Size is a relative factor … The consciousness resulting from its size is clearly evident in 
Nepal’s relations not only with its neighbours but also with various other countries of the 
world. 
 
 For some, Nepal’s foreign policy behaviour through the ages has been defined by a 
‘small state syndrome’. But, while many have inserted the term in their perceptions of Nepal’s 
behaviour, few have actively sought to define what the term means. A general understanding 
of the term would refer to the overinflated sense of self-importance that Nepal has inculcated 
in thinking that it is as significant to the bigger powers as they are for its own endurance to 
tackle the external threats present in the international ecosystem, and that those powers are 
tearing at its seams to devour it whole or in parts (Nepali Times, 2013). Another facet of such 
an analysis would look at the actual insecurities that have been expressed in its bilateral 
relations with India and China throughout the decades, and where it has often found itself in a 
vulnerable position. This outlook is affected by the reach of its neighbours in the global 
multilateral regimes, propagated by their “geopolitical clout and economic might” (Bhattarai, 
2017). 
 
Nepal as a small power: relevance of the concept 
 
 Nepal is easily perceived as a small state, given its gigantic neighbours, and the 
Lilliputian sources of its national power. However, an optimistic narrative is emerging in local 
public debates and general discussions that perceive Nepal as a small power. The desire to 
impress the idea that Nepal is such a small power comes from the hope to perceive the state as 
something more than a weaker link in bilateral, regional and global relations. 
 
 The intention behind this reiteration of an established impression of Nepal’s small 
status is to put the view to the fore, that it is not short of power due to its smallness but simply 
lacks “the opportunity to display it” (Kassimeris, 2009, p. 85), whether that is due to its own 
constraints or the asymmetry present in the systems it functions in. Small powers are “limited 
in their freedom by the nature of the systemic structure. For the most part they are dominated 
by the system, in the sense that opportunities they have are dependent on the kind of system 
which exists” (Rothstein, 1968, p. 182). The direct causality of size and power/influence is 
reduced and so is their dominance in the liberal order. It would lead to the belief that, although 
a state may be (perceived as) small, it does not have to be powerless or handicapped. This 
assumption would undertake an approach that would look at its restricted capabilities, and their 
viability for interest fulfilment, given that conditions are conducive enough for Nepal to utilise 
them. Scholars have started to explore the outlook that, while small states do find difficulty in 
participating in global affairs and influencing the system, they do have some ability to fill the 
gaps that are left by the perceived greater powers. Aditya (2021) contextualised this approach 
in the cases of Qatar and Nepal, acknowledging the differences in their geopolitical landscapes, 
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and opining that Nepal has the potential to become a financial hub, is gifted with the natural 
resources and, after coming “out of its centuries-old chrysalis, it has a society with a glorious 
past, a hospitable present and a bountiful future, beckoning the citizens to shed their size 
pessimism and historic amnesia to unlock the hidden potentials of the land” (para. 1). Nepal 
also serves as a security ring for both China and India, and its water sources may prove vital 
for the surrounding plains as climate change has become a grave reality, unless it succumbs to 
“water politics” at home, and in the region. 
 
 There has been a sustaining argument that Nepal’s strategic location both in the 
Himalayan range due to its hydropower potential, and in between the growing economies of 
India and China, may provide it with some room for manoeuvre from what appear to be 
stringent geographic constraints. In a 2020 report, the Asian Development Bank argued that, 
 
Nepal is strategically located between the two largest countries in Asia: India and the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). These two countries are facing annual demand for 
electricity of about 5 million GWh. Bangladesh is facing growing energy demand and 
it is also energy-deficient … India, the PRC, and other neighbouring Asian countries 
like Bangladesh, could easily absorb any additional supply of electricity over and above 
the needs of Nepal, provided that suitable transmission infrastructure is in place. (p. 3). 
 
There are some basic pitfalls in this viewpoint, however, as the “underperforming 
electricity sector in Nepal, with inadequate and unreliable supply of poor-quality electricity,” 
serves as “a major development constraint” (ADB, 2020, p. 2). Currently, the World Bank 
(2021) has projected that Nepal’s GDP will only grow by 0.6% in Fiscal Year 2021 due to 
COVID-19, as the recovery rate for countries like Nepal that are dependent on external sources 
of economic growth like remittance and tourism, are likely to expect a more modest recovery, 
at best. Amidst such dire predictions, there is a path to transition from a small state to a small 
power. It is not a novel concept that Nepal should be able to benefit from the bulging economic 
development of its neighbours, and while a standard spillover effect might not be the answer 
to its predicaments, both China and India stand at the top amongst countries who have pledged 
FDI commitments in 2019/20 (Department of Industries, 2020, p. vii).  
 
 Additionally, Nepal’s Doing Business score, taken out by the World Bank, for 2020, 
was 94 amongst 190 countries, improving in its trading practices, construction permits and the 
introduction of new civil procedures, but it still lags in the ease of starting a business, which 
may discourage potential investors. The opportunities towards envisaging a small power status 
are numerous, but it boils down to Nepal’s own political will to move beyond its internal 
struggles and review the strength of its own institutions. Political and financial stability, for the 
realisation of such goals, are necessary conditions and there has been a tendency for political 
parties in power to treat investment potential as temporary political bargaining chips, utilizing 
them as a means towards maintaining an administration’s legitimacy and closeness with 
another government. It happened with the uncertainty and controversy that followed one of 
Nepal’s biggest Hydropower Projects, the Budhi Gandaki, and its fluctuating connection with 
the Chinese Gezhouba Group Corporation.   
 
Having already identified the priority sectors of investment, Nepal needs to ensure that 
beyond attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), it must cultivate better channels of 
diplomatic engagement with its neighbours and curb the exhausting bureaucratic red tape to 
permit a climate that is investor-friendly. A decisive factor in these circumstances would be 
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the Nepalese government’s ability to distinguish between personal, party and state matters, and 




 After all, smallness is also a matter of reach. Nepal’s big neighbours – India and China 
– have a global influence largely due to their geopolitical clout and economic might.  Nepal is 
not the only small state, in perception or in fact, in this region. As India and China engage in a 
bitter geopolitical rivalry, small states in their vicinity (like Nepal) are obliged to pay close 
heed to their strategic and economic concerns (Bhattarai, 2017). At present, China is apparently 
lobbying with the small states in South Asia to expand its markets and investment 
opportunities. But for India, South Asia comes under its sphere of influence, and whenever the 
two powers feel their concerns are not heeded, small states have been penalised. When Nepal 
discounted India’s diktat over the new constitution, it went through a period of economic 
blockade. Its protracted political transition further complicates Nepal’s neighbourhood policy 
(Bhattarai, 2017). Similarly, in the case of South Asian small states that have opted to widen 
links with China with some success, there are certain roadblocks in fully absorbing definitive 
gains from the regional powers. 
 
Even though China is offering greater economic assistance, they, except Pakistan, are 
unlikely to bandwagon or form an alliance with China militarily because if they do so 
they are likely to receive the wrath of India, the dominant power of the region and the 
United States, the global power which still has a strong naval presence in the Indian 
Ocean. (Paul, 2019, p. 59). 
 
 Big countries have large markets, large defence budgets, significant influence and a 
towering presence abroad. For small countries like Nepal, the opposite applies. As a result, 
their development is obstructed, as they become dependent on regional powers even for their 
infrastructural development. Instead of building interdependence, Nepal became increasingly 
and dangerously dependent on India. The relationship between small states and emerging 
powers is also multilayered. Although the world is heading to multi-polarity and 
interdependence (notwithstanding the resurgence of neo-realism and populism), regional 
powers like India and China have also acquired more powerful international roles. 
 
 Some Chinese scholars have been openly claiming that Nepal’s strategic location 
provides geographical advantage to China, which it can use to enter South Asia (Tao, 2017). 
Although Nepal’s foreign policy strictly adheres to the principle of non-interference and 
prohibits the use of Nepali soil against other countries, Nepali politicians and bureaucrats have 
not been able to probe such claims from the North. The bureaucratization of India’s foreign 
policy (particularly when it comes to dealing with her small neighbours) and the politicisation 
of small states’ foreign policy (in dealing with big powers) have made the dichotomy more 
pronounced. The interests of big powers and the vulnerabilities of the small states can be 
addressed through strategic partnerships. Likewise, the economic aspirations of small states 
may be fulfilled through economic cooperation, through the economic corridors between big 
and small states (Bhattarai, 2017). These probable win-win solutions will have to be worked 
out in order to minimise growing geopolitical conflicts, which would eventually boost Nepal’s 
small power capabilities through trade, tourism, connectivity, investment and diplomacy. 
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 Nepal’s literary genius Laxmi Prasad Devkota asked “Is Nepal small?”, detailing his 
sentiment on the matter by professing that there were two ways in which the problem of 
distinction between the small and the big was observed in the world: in materialistic terms, and 
in terms that in literal translations would look through a perceptual window, including aspects 
that transcend material juxtapositions. But the matter is defiantly more complex than the 
writer’s almost idealistic vision of Nepal: with its rich natural landscapes and the pride of the 
culture and of the land, as well as the grandeur with which he portrays his opinions. If Nepal 
is truly to be considered as such, it would need to face and question many of its own constraints 
and reevaluate its policy actions.  The solutions to Nepal’s own structural scarcity, with regards 
to its national power, would depend on its own institutional strengths and the political keenness 
of its leaders. However, the impact that the regional powers hold over it also devises the 
blueprint for its small state syndrome. Referring to the Lilliputians’ dilemma, Keohane (1969, 
p. 246) classified such a state as “a small power … whose leaders consider that it can never, 
acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system”.  
 
 Nepal has, more often than not, opted to forgo active assertive engagements with the 
surrounding powers. The Kalapani border dispute between Nepal and India is a recent example. 
Kathmandu largely adopted a policy of inaction regarding the issue and subsequently decided 
to publish a new map in 2020, including the areas of Lipulekh, Kalapani and Limpiyadhura, 
countering India’s political map issued in 2019, encompassing all the makings of a diplomatic 
blunder (Giri, 2020). Small states that face structural weakness habitually seek “shelter” from 
larger states and institutions for “political, economic and societal” reasons, to decrease risks, 
to ensure that assistance can be received if risk occurs and also for post-crisis recovery 
(Thorhallsson, 2018). These sorts of shelter that states receive come with some forms of 
compensation. It can be akin to that of the relationship between Bhutan and India, with Bhutan 
being included in India’s security umbrella, in exchange for New Delhi’s military and political 
assistance in the face of Beijing’s move into the Himalayan territories with its claim on Tibet 
(Schottli, Mitra, & Wolf, 2015, p. 71). It can also be witnessed in cases like that of Armenia 
and Russia, tied together by their Christian history and the former’s desire for survival. The 
smaller state is enclosed by Muslim states on either side and has a history of territorial dispute 
with Azerbaijan. It sought a “strategic shelter” first from the Soviets and then from Russia, but 
has been known to seek shelter from multiple global powers, including the West when found 
suitable (Bailes, Thayer, & Thorhallsson, 2016). Thorhallsson (2019, p. 384) explains that, 
 
Small states have to compensate for their weaknesses in order to survive and thrive. Small 
states are unable to overcome their structural weaknesses, such as having fewer 
inhabitants, smaller domestic markets (and GDP), smaller territory and limited military 
capacity as compared to larger states. However, small states can compensate for their 
inbuilt vulnerability by adopting particular domestic and/or external measures. 
 
 In the case of Nepal, shelter came in the form of a semblance of economic stability and 
ironically, for the maintenance of its security and sovereignty. While Nepal has never formally 
adopted a policy of explicit alignment since the mid-1990’s becoming a part of NAM, it has 
routinely aligned its interests with that of its neighbours, suiting its benefits at different points 
in history, as explained above. Towards the South, Nepal shares a long open border with India 
that mostly allows for unhindered movement, has a pegged currency system that provides it 
with financial stability, and access to some of the most viable routes of transit. Due to much 
touted religious and cultural ties, it has historically tilted towards India, but since King 
Mahendra’s undertaking of an equidistance policy, Nepal has been known to routinely use 
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China as a balancing card. In current times, the reigning political sentiments have shown its 
inclinations towards the North for its development needs. 
 
 It would be illogical for Nepal, however, to forsake one state in favour of the other; and 
it has astutely refrained from doing so to a greater degree. In compensating for its structural 
weakness, it has tried to further relations of mutual recognition and respect with its neighbours, 
often waylaid by its own diplomatic pitfalls and temporary political alignments. For the most 
part, Nepal’s national power sources are different to that of its big power counterparts, as it 
relies more on its diplomatic channels and its cultural linkages; but it has yet to mobilise them 
effectively beyond general listings on paper. Nepal may be small in the context of its relations 
with its neighbours; but its political leadership has been unable to compensate for those 
weaknesses in its bilateral or multilateral associations. And so, its institutions have remained 
volatile and its development arrested. 
 
 The small state syndrome is not just about a state somehow being entrapped in its own 
mindset of smallness and its ensuing vulnerability. It extends to the missteps that have been 
allowed in the name of survival. For Nepal, it also extends to the absolute disarray permitted 
in the diplomatic engagements it has had with its neighbours, from the promulgation of the 
2015 Constitution to the border disputes. International politics is not about equality or fairness 
as long as power asymmetry drives state relations, but about aligning interests. Kathmandu 




 Nepal is a small state when it is weighed alongside either of its neighbours. However, 
it is also a small state in the fact that it falls vulnerable not just to its own structural weaknesses 
but also to its government’s inability to handle neighbourly interests, whilst managing its own. 
The end of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal has led to hopes for the revitalisation of democracy, 
participation, stability and, most of all, sustainable development. Lingering territorial disputes 
and constant fluctuations in policy actions with its neighbours, while remaining firm on paper 
with the idea of non-alignment, do not translate well into Nepal’s position as a plausible small 
power. The instability that led to vulnerabilities has contributed to the sensitivity Nepal 
experiences in being part of such a fractured regional space, while participating within its own 
asymmetric bilateral relations. Nepal’s potential lies in its smallness, where it can be a neutral 
state engaging with the greater powers, without posing any threat to either of the competing 
states. 
 
 Instead of simply identifying the neighbourhood as the prime cause of its smallness, 
Nepal’s interest lies in taking advantage of and from the neighbourhood economically, and 
strengthening its sources of national power. It has been centuries since the landlocked nation 
has negotiated and bartered with the surrounding powers, and while foreign policy is malleable 
as the geopolitical landscapes shift, the leading political stakeholders have to shed off the guise 
of smallness that has been built, beyond that of the actual vulnerabilities of the small state, and 
look towards detecting the sources of its national power and compete and cooperate on the 
basis of the state’s strengths and weaknesses. Its landlocked reality will always make it 
dependent on India and China for transit; but, as both neighbours rise economically and indulge 
their interests in South Asia, a small state that is strategically situated between them, and one 
which carries prospects in hydropower and forms an essential security strip for both states, 
should be able to gain leverage in its dealings, if it understands the national interests of the 
neighbours along the way, and hones its diplomatic stance onto these. Nepal has long been 
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vying for a simple goal: survival. Now, it needs to look beyond just enduring the threats, by 
developing and fine-tuning its small power capabilities in constant cooperation with its 
immediate neighbours and beyond. 
Disclaimer 
 
This article did not benefit from research funding. 
References 
 
2021 Military Strength Ranking. (2021). Retrieved from: 
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp  
Aditya, A. (2021, January 5). Qatar and Nepal: power of the small. The Himalayan Times. 
Retrieved from: https://thehimalayantimes.com/opinion/qatar-and-nepal-power-of-the-
small  
Atique, F. (1983). Nepal’s foreign policy. Pakistan Horizon, 36(4), 94-108. 
Bailes, A. J., Thayer, B. A., & Thorhallsson, B. (2016). Alliance theory and alliance ‘shelter’: 
the complexities of small state alliance behaviour. Third World Thematics: A TWQ 
Journal, 1-18.  
Bhattarai, G. (2017, March 27). No small concern. Retrieved from: 
https://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/no-small-concern/  
BBC. (2018, February 19). Nepal country profile. Retrieved from: 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12511455   
Bjøl, E. (1968, July 1). The power of the weak. Cooperation and Conflict, 3(2), 157-168. 
Bjøl, E. (1971). The small state in international politics. In A. S. Brundland (Ed.), Small states 
in international relations (pp. 29-39). New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Brand Finance. (2021, February 26). Global Soft Power Index 2021. Retrieved from: 
https://brandirectory.com/globalsoftpower/download/brand-finance-global-soft-
power-index-2021.pdf   
Chaudhury, D. R. (2021, January 30). Nepalese businessmen launch protests against China’s 




Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked States. (1965, July 8). Retrieved from 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=X-
3&chapter=10&clang=_en  
Couloumbis, T. A. & Wolfe, J. H. (1986). Introduction to international relations: Power and 
justice (3rd edn.). Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Crossette, B. (1989, April 11). Nepal’s economy is gasping as India, a huge neighbour, 
squeezes it. New York Times. Retrieved from: 
https://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/11/world/nepal-s-economy-is-gasping-as- india-a-
huge-neighbour-squeezes-it-hard.html  
Dabhade, M., & Pant, H. V. (2004). Coping with challenges to sovereignty: Sino‐Indian rivalry 
and Nepal’s foreign policy. 13(2), 157-169. 
Dahal, D. R. (2011). The art of survival: policy choices for Nepal. Dhaulagiri Journal of 
Sociology and Anthropology, 5(1), 31-48. 
Dahl, R. A. (1957). The concept of power. Behavioral Science, 2(3), 201-215. 
G. Bhattarai & S. Karki  
 366
Devkota, L. P. (2018). Is Nepal small? [Ke Nepal sano cha?] In L. P. Devkota (Ed.), Laxmi 
nibandh sangraha (pp. 51-57). Kathmandu: Sajha Prakashan. 
Dhanalaxmi, R. (1981). British attitude to Nepal's relations with Tibet and China (1814-1914). 
New Delhi: Bahri Publications. 
Dickinson, E. D. (1920). The equality of states in international law (Vol. III). Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
East, M. A. (1973). Size and foreign policy behavior: A test of two models. World Politics, 
25(4), 556-576. 
Fox, A. B. (1969). The small states in the international system, 1919-1969. International 
Journal, 24(4), 751-764.  
Garver, J. W. (1992). China and South Asia. The ANNALS of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 519, 67-85. 
Ghoble, T. (1992). India and China - Nepal relations 1950-1980 an appraisal. Proceedings of 
the Indian History Congress, 53, 598-606. 
Giri, A. (2020, May 8). India opening a road via Lipulekh, a territory that Nepal claims, is a 
diplomatic failure. The Kathmandu Post. Retrieved from 
https://kathmandupost.com/national/2020/05/08/india-opening-a-road-via-lipulekh-a-
territory-that-nepal-claims-is-a-diplomatic-failure 
Glassner, M. I. (1978). Transit rights for land-locked states and the special case of Nepal. World 
Affairs, 140(4), 304-314. 
Global Firepower (2021). Global Firepower Index. 
https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php  
Hartmann, F. H. (1978). The Relations of Nations (5th ed.). New York: Macmillan. 
Jablonsky, D. (2006). National Power. In J. B. Bartholomees (Ed.), U. S. Army War College 
Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy (pp. 127-142). Pennsylvania: Strategic 
Studies Institute, US Army War College. 
Jessop, B. (2016). The State: Past, present, future. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Kassimeris, C. (2009). The foreign policy of small powers. International Politics, 46(1), 84-
101. 
Keohane, R. O. (1969). Lilliputians' dilemmas: small states in international politics. 
International Organization, 23(2), 291-310. 
Keohane, R. O. (1977). Power and interdependence: World politics in transition. Boston MA: 
Little Brown. 
Khadka, N. (1992). Geopolitics and development: A Nepalese perspective. Asian Affairs: An 
American Review, 19(3), 134–157. 
Koh, T. (2019). Foreword. In R. J. Breiding, Too small to fail: Why some small nations 
outperform larger ones and how they are reshaping (p. ix). New York: Harper 
Business. 
Kurečić, P., Kozina, G., & Kokotović, F. (2017). Revisiting the definition of the small state 
through the use of relational and quantitative criteria. 19th International Scientific 
Conference on Economic and Social Development (pp. 129-142). Melbourne, 
Australia: Varazdin Development and Entrepreneurship Agency. 
Levi, W. (1957, September). Nepal in world politics. Pacific Affairs, 30(3), 236-248. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Nepal. (2020, September 25). Statement by Right 
Hon. Prime Minister Mr. K P Sharma Oli at the General Debate of the 75th Session of 
UNGA. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from https://mofa.gov.np/statement-by-
right-honorable-prime-minister-mr-k-p-sharma-oli-at-the-general-debate-of-the-75th-
session-of-unga/  
Muni, S. D. (2016). Foreign policy of Nepal. New Delhi: Adroit Publishers. 
A gourd between two stones: Reconceptualising Nepal from a small state to a small power 
 367
Mushkat, M. (1972). The process of decolonization: International legal aspects. University of 
Baltimore Law Review, 2(1), 16-34. 
Nepali Times. (2013, June 6). Between a rock and a hard place. Nepali Times. Retrieved from 
https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/editorial/Between,439  
Neumann, I. B., & Gstöhl, S. (2004). Lilliputians in Gulliver’s world?: Small states in 
international relations. Reykjavik: Institute for International Affairs, Centre for Small 
State Studies. University of Iceland. 
Paul, T. (2019). When balance of power meets globalization: China, India and the small states 
of South Asia. Poliitics, 39(1), 50–63. 
Rana, M. S. (2013, June-December). China meets India in Nepal: A historical and future 
perspective. Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, 26(1/2), 59-73. 
Rose, L. E., & Scholz, J. T. (1980). Nepal: profile of a Himalayan kingdom. Boulder CO: 
Westview Press, Inc. 
Rothstein, R. L. (1968). Alliances and small powers. New York : Columbia University Press. 
Shakya, S. (2019, June 7). Nepal still awaits economic reform. East Asia Forum. Retrieved 
from https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/06/07/nepal-still-awaits-economic-reform/  
Shakya, S. (2020, January 1). Hope amid political, geopolitical and investment challenges in 
Nepal. East Asia Forum. Retrieved from 
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/01/01/hope-amid-political-geopolitical-and-
investment-challenges-in-nepal/  
Sigdel, A. (2018, October 3). China’s growing footprint in Nepal: Challenges and 
opportunities for India. Observer Research Foundation. Retrieved from 
https://www.orfonline.org/research/chinas-growing-footprint-in-nepal-challenges-
and-opportunities-for-india/  
Stebbins, R. A. (2001). Exploratory research in the social sciences. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage. 
Stiller, L. F. (1976). The silent cry: The people of Nepal 1816 to 1839. Kathmandu: Sahayogi 
Prakashan. 
Strang, D. (1996). Contested sovereignty: the social construction of colonial imperialism. In T. 
J. Biersteker & C. Weber, State sovereignty as social construct (pp. 22-49). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Subedi, S. P. (2020, November 29). Economic diplomacy for Nepal. Kathmandu Post. 
Retrieved from: https://kathmandupost.com/columns/2020/11/29/economic-
diplomacy-for-nepal  




Tao, L. (2017, February 3). From yam to bridge. Retrieved from: 
https://kathmandupost.com/opinion/2017/02/03/from-yam-to-bridge  
Thakur, P. C., & Sahani, K. K. (2018). The historical and geographical effects of the Treaty of 
Sugaouli. Global Research Academy Multidisciplinary International Journal, 2, 6-15. 
Thapa, D. (2016, December 29). 200 years of Nepal-UK. Retrieved from: 
https://kathmandupost.com/national/2016/12/29/200-years-of-nepal-uk-ties  
The Kathmandu Post (2020, May 20). Government unveils new political map including 
Kalapani, Lipulekh and Limpiyadhura inside Nepal borders. Retrieved from 
https://kathmandupost.com/national/2020/05/20/government-unveils-new-political-
map-including-kalapani-lipulekh-and-limpiyadhura-inside-nepal-borders  
The Economic Times. (2020, March 15). Nepal objected to India's road to Lipulekh at someone 
else's behest: Army Chief. Retrieved from: 




The World Bank. (2021). The World Bank in small states. Retrieved from: 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/smallstates/overview  
Thorhallsson, B., & Steinsson, S. (2017). Small state foreign policy. In Oxford Research 
Encyclopedia of Politics (pp. 1-26). Doi: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.484  
Thorhallsson, B. (2018). The theory of shelter. Small states and the new security environment. 
Reykjavik: University of Iceland. 
Thorhallsson, B. (2019). Small states and the changing global order: what small state theory 
can offer New Zealand foreign policymaking. In A.-M. Brady (Ed.), Small states and 
the changing global order: New Zealand faces the future (pp. 379-395). Cham: 
Springer International. 
Thucydides. (2009). The Peloponnesian war. (M. Hammond, trans.) Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
United Nations Peacekeeping. (2021, March 3). Troop and police contributors. Retrieved from 
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors  
Upadhya, S. (2012). Nepal and the geo-strategic rivalry between China and India. New York: 
Routledge. 
Vandenbosch, A. (1964). The small states in international politics and organization. The 
Journal of Politics, 26(2), 293-312. 
Vital, D. (1967). The inequality of states: A study of the small in international relations. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Walt, S. M. (1987). The origins of alliance. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press. 
Wilson, E. J. (2008, March 1). Hard power, soft power, smart power. The ANNALS of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616(1), 110-124. 
Worldometer. (2021, February 9). Nepal population (LIVE). Retrieved from 
https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/nepal-population/  
World Bank Group. (2020). Doing Business 2020: Comparing business regulation in 190 
Economies. Washington DC: The World Bank. Retrieved from 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/32436/9781464814402
.pdf  
